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An examination of over 40 years of data reveals that oil price shocks are invariably fol-
lowed by 2e3 years of weak economic growth and weak economic growth is almost always
preceded by an oil price shock. This paper reviews why the price-inelastic demand and
supply of oil cause oil price shocks and why oil price shocks reduce economic growth
through dislocations of labor and capital. This paper also reviews the current state of oil-
supply security noting that previous episodes of supply instability appear to have become
chronic conditions. While new unconventional oil production technologies have revital-
ized North American oil production, there are significant barriers to a world-wide uptake
of these technologies. Strategic petroleum stocks could provide a large measure of pro-
tection to the world economy during an oil supply disruption if they are used promptly and
in sufficient volume to prevent large oil-price spikes. Despite the large volume of world-
wide emergency reserves, their effectiveness in protecting world economies is not
assured. Strategic oil stocks have not been used in sufficient quantity or soon enough to
avoid the economic downturns that followed past oil supply outages. In addition, the
growth of U.S. oil production has reduced the ability of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum
Reserve to protect the economy following a future oil supply disruption. The policy im-
plications of these findings are discussed.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Plan of the paper
This paper discusses the vulnerability of the world economy to un-
planned oil supply interruptions and how strategic petroleum stocks
can lessen or entirely avoid the adverse economic consequences of a
serious oil supply outage. The paper is organized into fourteen sections
beginning with a discussion of the short-term price elasticity of demand
for oil, the initial reason why oil supply outages can cause oil price
spikes. After reviewing the literature concerning the price and income
elasticities of demand for gasoline and crude oil (Sections 2 and 3), the
second problem is discussed: the very small short-term price elasticity
of oil supply (Section 4). The inelastic short-term price elasticities of
demand and supply imply that relatively small supply outages can
produce large oil price spikes (Section 5).e.gov. The analysis, data and
d are not endorsed by the U.S.
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND lA history of oil pricing from 1970 to the present day (Section 6) is
provided as background to an assessment of how each oil price spike
since 1970 was followed by an economic downturn (Section 7). Oil price
shocks were invariably followed by 2e3 years of weak economic growth
and weak economic growth was almost always preceded by an oil price
shock. Section 8 investigates the reasons why oil price spikes cause
recessions and unemployment in order to confirm that there is a causal
relationship between oil price spikes and sharp reductions in GDP
growth. Turning towards the future, it’s observed that the recent
geopolitical disruptions in several oil exporting countries are not likely
to be passing problems (Section 9). While increased North American oil
production has offset these losses, it is not likely that the new tech-
nologies responsible for the rise in U.S. production will bring about
inexpensive world oil supplies. Consequently, the world-wide economy
is likely to remain vulnerable to future oil outages (Section 10).
Strategic oil reserves have been used in response to past oil supply
problems. However, had the reserves been released soon after the initial
disruption, in sufficient volumes to offset the supply loss, the subsequenticense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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reduced U.S. oil import dependence raises questions about why the
United States should stillmaintain large strategic stocks. ReducedU.S. oil
dependence is also restricting the ability of the United States to release
its strategic stocksbecauseof recentmidstreamand shippingbottlenecks
(Section 13). Conclusions and policy implications, especially for U.S. and
world-wide stock holding policies, are provided in Section 14.2. The short-term price elasticity and income elasticity of
gasoline demand
If crude oil demand does not slacken very much when oil prices rise,
we are more likely to see large increases in oil prices in order to balance
themarket after an oil supply outage. Since crude oil is an intermediate
good, the demand for oil depends on consumers’ purchases of petro-
leum products. Refiners will continue to purchase crude oil when oil
prices increase as long as petroleum products can still be sold at a
profit. If the demand for petroleum products is inelastic2, then refiners
will not greatly reduce their demand for crude oil as it becomes more
expensive. Consequently, it makes more sense to estimate how pe-
troleum product demand responds to changes in price than to estimate
how refiners respond to changes in the price of crude petroleum.
Gasoline is one of the most important consumer products produced
from crude oil and, along with distillate and jet fuel, these fuels
constitute the bulk of revenues to petroleum refineries. Kilian [1] noted
that an analysis of the economic impacts of energy price shocks
benefited from “a direct measure of gasoline prices” as this was “more
relevant than a measure of crude oil prices.”
Earlier studies found the short-term price elasticity of gasoline to be
between 0.1 and 0.3.3 For example, a survey by Greening, Greene
and Difiglio [2] found that the estimated elasticity of demand for
travel, with respect to the price of gasoline was between 0.1
and 0.25.4 An earlier survey by the Dahl and Sterner [3] concluded
that the average estimated price elasticity of gasoline demand
was 0.26 and that the average income elasticity of gasoline demand
was 0.48. Espey’s “meta-analysis” [4] considered hundreds of studies of
gasoline demand, most of which relied on data from the 1970s and
1980s, and found that the great majority (over 200) estimated the short
run price elasticity of gasoline demand to be between 0 and 0.25.
Most estimates of the income elasticity of gasoline demand were be-
tween 0.26 and 0.50 (short-term) and 0.76 and 1.00 (long-term). Espey
also found that the earlier studies estimated higher short-term price
elasticities than the later studies but did not find any trend in the es-
timates of income elasticities. However, Espey did note that income
elasticities were higher in studies that included data from developing
and other countries outside of the United States suggesting that
countries with lower incomes and less saturated auto ownership have a
higher income elasticity of gasoline demand. If so, this has implications
for future oil demand as developing countries have higher growth rates
of GDP than developed countries and helps to explain the rapid growth
of oil consumption outside of the OECD.5
Studies that analyzed more recent data show a dramatic decrease
of the short-term price elasticity of gasoline. Small and Van Dender [6]2 Inelastic demand means that the price of a commodity or product has a relatively
small effect on its demand.
3 A short term price elasticity of gasoline demand of 0.1 means that an increase in
the gasoline price by 10% would reduce the short term demand for gasoline by 1%. The
long-run effect would be greater since higher gasoline prices could motivate purchases
of more efficient vehicles or taking other actions that would reduce gasoline expenses
(e.g., moving to a location that requires less automotive travel).
4 The surveyed studies in Greening, Greene and Difiglio used data from 1967e1991.
5 The majority of oil demand has recently shifted from the OECD to the non-OECD. By
2030, China is expected to become the world’s largest consumer of petroleum while
OECD oil demand is expected to decline [5].estimate a short-term price elasticity of gasoline demand of 0.089
using 1966e2001 data but find that it decreases to 0.067 when they
only used data for 1997e2001. Hughes, Knittel and Sperling [7] esti-
mate that the price elasticity drops from 0.222 using data for
1975e1980 to0.034 using data for 2001e2006. They also find that the
income elasticity of gasoline demand increases from 0.212 to 0.506
when the later 2001e2006 data is used. Hughes, Knittel and Sperling
attribute the declining short term price elasticity of demand to several
factors: suburban development has increased average trip distances;
distances between homes and non-discretionary destinations have
increased; multiple-income households are more dependent on
commuting, public transportation use has declined and motor-vehicle
fuel efficiency is substantially higher. Another recent study by Lin
and Prince [8] included a survey of recent studies concluding that “the
short-run gasoline price elasticity shifted down considerably from a
range of 0.21 to 0.34 in the late 1970s to 0.034 to 0.077 in the
early 2000s.” Lin and Price’s dynamic model, using U.S. data, focuses
on the relationship between price elasticity and gasoline price vola-
tility. They find that price elasticity is somewhat lower during periods
with higher volatility (0.030) than lower volatility (0.036).
Contrary evidence by Kilian and Murphy [9] needs to be put into
perspective. They concluded that “the median short-run price elas-
ticity of gasoline demand is about 0.26,” an estimate that is several
times larger than the several estimates cited above. Kilian and Murphy
derived this estimate using a model in which oil prices were endoge-
nous. They stated: “earlier studies fail to account for price endogeneity
and cannot be interpreted as an elasticity in the textbook sense.” To
address this, Kilian and Murphy embed the elasticity of oil demand with
respect to income into their price-elasticity estimate. The simulta-
neous equation model used by Kilian and Murphy explicitly introduces
an income-feedback variable (shipping index) that conveys a macro-
economic impact on oil demand following an oil price shock. As such,
Killian and Murphy’s relatively high oil price elasticity estimate is not
inconsistent with the very low static price elasticity estimates from the
other studies cited above so long as we recognize the macroeconomic
feedback is not incorporated in the other studies. As noted below,
these macroeconomic feedbacks have important impacts on oil prices
and economic welfare.
3. The short-term price elasticity and income elasticity of crude
oil demand
Studies of the short term price elasticity of demand for crude pe-
troleum confirm the results obtained for gasoline demand studies. For
example, Cooper [10] estimates G7 countries to have a short term
elasticity of demand for crude oil from0.024 to0.069 and, for all 23
countries studied, the range expands to 0.0 to 0.11. Gately and
Huntington [11] estimated a short-run demand elasticity for crude oil
of 0.05 for OECD countries and 0.03 for non-OECD countries. They
estimated a long-run income elasticity of oil demand of 0.56 for OECD
countries and 0.53 for non-OECD countries. Baumeister and Peersman
[12] report that the elasticity of demand for crude oil has sharply
decreased from 1970 to 2008. They find that “the price elasticity has
decreased [in absolute value] from0.05 to0.15 during the 1970s and
early 1980s to as small as 0.01 to 0.02 since the mid-1980s.” One
factor that can help explain this change is themovement away from oil-
fired generation in the power sector and space heating from 1978 to
1985 observed by Dargay and Gately [13]. Power generation and other
stationary uses of oil fuels have greater opportunities for fuel switching
than the transport sector where the opportunities for fuel switching are
insignificant.
Using different estimation techniques, Krichene [14] found a short-
term elasticity of demand for crude oil of 0.005 to 0.02 using data
from 1973e1999. For the same period he found a short-term income
elasticity crude oil demand of 1.2 to 1.45. Ghouri [15] estimated, for
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and similar income elasticities for Canada (1.08) and Mexico (0.84).
Askari and Krichene [16], estimating the demand for crude oil, found
that “short-run price elasticities were very low and insignificant for
several time periods between 1970 and 2008. Askari and Krichene’s
price elasticity estimates ranged from0.018 for 1986e2001 data to as
low as þ0.004 (essentially zero) for 2001e2008 data. The estimated
price elasticity for 1970e2008 and 1970e1986 was 0.018. Askari and
Krichene conclude that:
“oil demand is highly price inelastic, implying that changes in oil
prices have a small effect on the demand for crude oil. Large in-
crease in prices will translate into much larger spending on oil and
therefore, ceteris paribus, a reduction of spending on non-oil
products.”6 Due to an inability for oil production to keep up with the supply needed to support
robust world-wide economic growth. For example, see Kopits [19] and Tverberg [20].4. The short-term price elasticity of oil supply
In the short run, oil supply can respond to oil price changes in the
following ways:
 Higher oil prices (and backwardation of the forward curve) may
stimulate the drawdown of oil stocks.
 Saudi Arabia, and a handful of other countries that hold some
reserve production capacity, may decide to move reserve capacity
into or out of production as oil prices rise or fall.
 If oil prices fall to levels that fail to justify the marginal cost of oil
production, those wells would be shut in or fracking operations
could be slowed or terminated. Higher oil prices could also stim-
ulate higher tight-oil production more quickly than conventional
oil production could increase.
Apart from stock draws or increased Saudi production, oil producers
are unable respond to higher oil prices by increasing production to any
significant degree. Oil companies can only respond to higher or lower
oil prices by increasing or decreasing planned investments in new
production capacity. Consequently, the short-term elasticity of oil
supply with respect to price is quite small. If high income growth in-
creases the world-wide demand for oil faster than the world-wide
growth of supply, oil producers cannot quickly respond to the conse-
quent increases in oil prices as their maximum production generally
depends on investments made years earlier. Baumeister and Peersman
[17] show that the short term response of oil supply has become quite
price-inelastic over time, pointing out that the decreased price elas-
ticity of supply makes inter-temporal comparisons of the economic
impacts of oil supply shocks more difficult. As Baumeister and Peers-
man point out, for a given supply-demand imbalance, the global oil
price increase has to be significantly greater now than in the past. This
is borne out as we have seen high price increases during periods of high
world economic growth (for example, from 2002e2008) or unplanned
petroleum supply outages (many examples summarized below).
5. Why the underlying short term price elasticities of oil supply
and demand generate oil price spikes
There are significant consequences resulting from the very low price
elasticity of demand and supply. Low price elasticities mean that very
large price changes are required to significantly increase supply or
decrease demand. Consequently a relatively small unplanned oil supply
outage can produce an oil price spike. In addition, because of the
relatively high income elasticity of oil demand, rapidly rising world
economic growth grows oil demand. If rapid economic growth grows oil
demand faster than can be accommodated by the growth in oil supply,
oil prices can rise significantly. As rising oil expenditures are a large
enough component of GDP to adversely affect economic growth, theseinteractions can produce the following oil price - economic growthe oil
production investment cycle:
 Due to:
B low price elasticities, an unplanned supply outage spikes oil
prices, or
B due to relatively high income elasticities, rapid GDP growth
drives oil prices to high levels;
 The resulting high share of GDP spent on oil reverses GDP growth;
 With lower GDP growth, high income elasticity reduces oil
demand;
 With lower oil demand, low oil price elasticities sharply lower oil
prices; and
 Lower oil prices and reduced GDP growth discourage oil production
investment.
World GDP growth and oil prices are periodically engaged in the
cycle described above. Kilian [18] notes that oil price shocks do not
affect the real price of oil for very long. The above narrative attributes
the price drop to reduced economic growth. Kilian finds that the effect
of an oil price shock is delayed: “there is some indication that [oil price
shocks] lower global economic activity in the third year after the
shock” and, consequently, Kilian attributes the rapid reduction in oil
prices to an oil supply response. However, as will be discussed below,
after every oil price shock, we observe significantly reduced world-
wide economic growth in the first, second and third years following
the shock. Reduced economic growth, combined with a relatively high
income elasticity of oil demand, explains why the price of oil declines
so soon after an oil price shock rather than an immediate increase in oil
supply.
Oil prices can also stabilize at relatively high levels just short of
what would cause a downturn in GDP growth if GDP growth is relatively
modest (e.g., the economic conditions that have persisted during the
last few years). The relatively high oil prices, during these circum-
stances, may reflect oil supplies sufficient to keep the oil market in
balance with modest world-wide economic growth but oil prices are too
high, and oil supplies too inelastic, to support higher economic
growth.6
6. Oil price history
World oil prices have, from time to time, reached levels that have
impaired world economic growth such as the aftermath of the 1973 oil
embargo. This “energy crisis” accompanied a major change in the way
petroleumwascontrolledandpriced.Prior to 1973,world oil priceswere
managed by the Texas Railroad Commission and a relatively small
number of large oil companies (super-majors) that enjoyed liberal ac-
cess to most countries’ oil resources. They could develop large oil fields
in host countries with terms that allowed ample world supply at non-
competitive but reasonable prices. The super-majors pursued a strat-
egy of affordable and stable oil prices since the resulting economic
growth in the industrializedworld increased thedemand for oil. By 1973,
theTexasRailroadCommissionwasno longer relevant and reforms in the
member-countries of theOrganizationof PetroleumExportingCountries
(OPEC) ended the super-majors’ control of world oil prices. The reforms
moved the control of the world’s largest oil resources from the inter-
national oil companies to the OPEC countries and, given sufficient
cohesion, allowed OPEC to control world oil prices.
OPEC’s control of oil prices was short-lived. The rapid price hikes
associated with the 1973 embargo and the 1979 Iranian revolution
stimulated new supplies, especially from the North Sea and Alaska. High
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automobiles. By 1981, oil prices began a steady decline. Saudi Arabia
tried to maintain higher prices by cutting production until, by 1985, its
output had fallen to 3million barrels per day (mmb/d), 70 percent lower
than it had been in 1980. In 1986, Saudi Arabia adopted netback pricing7
to regain market share. Oil prices collapsed to $12 per barrel8. By 1988,
the OPEC pricing regime was replaced by commodity market pricing, a
system that remains in place today and for the foreseeable future. The
London InterContinental Exchange (ICE) established a contract for
Brent, a mixture of high quality North Sea crudes9. The price trajectory
of Brent since 1987 is shown in Fig. 1. Additionally, the New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) established a contract for West Texas
Intermediate (WTI), a high-quality crude similar to Brent.
Today, only a small percentage of the world’s crude petroleum is
WTI, Brent or other traded “marker” crudes. Nonetheless, these
marker crudes affect the contract price of other types of crude oil since
most crude oil contracts are indexed to one or more marker crudes.
This new pricing regime did not entirely eliminate OPEC’s price setting
role. A few OPEC countries maintain spare oil production capacity.
Saudi Arabia, by far, keeps the largest production capacity in reserve.
Saudi Arabia can increase or decrease its oil production in response to
world market conditions. If Saudi Arabia believes that prices are too
high, it can put spare capacity into production, putting downward
pressure on market prices. Conversely, if Saudi Arabia believes that
prices are too low, it can reduce production (increasing spare capacity)
putting upward pressure on market prices. Most other oil producing
countries and all private oil companies are price takers. They only
respond to higher or lower oil prices by increasing or decreasing plan-
ned investments in new production capacity. Whether or not these
investments are made has little impact on current oil supplies or prices,
but may have a large impact on future oil supplies and prices.
The new pricing regime produced relatively stable, inflation
adjusted, oil prices until 1999 (except for a sharp increase in 1990 due
to the Gulf War). In 1999, oil prices began a sharp upward trend
culminating in an extremely sharp $40/b rise from January 2007 to June
2008. With record high oil prices, U.S. demand finally slackened and,
soon after, failing financial institutions precipitated a world-wide
banking crisis. Oil prices plummeted, reversing in one year the gains
made since 2005.
Since 2008, there have been two rapid increases in oil prices. In
early 2011, the Libyan civil war removed 1.5 mmb/d of light-sweet
crude from the market. Oil prices spiked again in 2012 due to
increased supply outages in Iran, Nigeria, Sudan and Yemen. The 2012
run-up was followed by a significant price slide due to a deteriorating
economic outlook in the Eurozone and uncertainty whether the EU and
the European Central Bank would take the necessary actions to prevent
an unraveling of the euro.7. Oil prices and GDP growth
Fig. 2 shows oil prices and annual changes in world-GDP. Each spike
in oil prices was followed by a sharp drop in world GDP growth. The
price rise from the 1973 oil embargo preceded a 4% drop in world GDP7 The netback price is based on a formula that subtracts from the price of petroleum
products the value added of refining and transport. While having certain attractive
features, it failed to be a practical method of pricing for oil.
8 Nominal dollars during the first half of 1986 or $22/b in constant dollars indexed to
2012.
9 The selection of Brent and WTI as marker crudes reflected several factors: 1) the
desirability of Brent and WTI to most refiners; 2) the sources of Brent (UK and Norway)
and WTI (United States) relative to the world’s financial capitals, London and New York;
3) the supply of Brent and WTI would not be controlled by national governments or
OPEC; and 4) Brent and WTI were produced in sufficient volumes to be an important
component of world oil supply.growth. Within two years, world growth slid from over 6% to 1%. The oil-
supply outage resulting from the 1979 Iranian revolution doubled oil
prices. Growth slid from 4% to 2% and, later, to below 1%.
The spike in oil prices resulting from the 1990 Gulf War led to a drop
in world GDP growth from over 3% in 1990 to 1% in 1991. GDP growth did
not return to 3% until 1994. The price spike from 1999e2000 was fol-
lowed by a drop in world GDP growth from over 4% in 2000 to 2% in 2001.
The world economy appeared to survive the long price rise from 2002 to
2007 until 2008, when the world suffered the worst financial crisis since
the 1930s. World GDP growth dropped from over 4% in 2007 to less than
2% in 2008 and then plummeted to 2% in 2009. While the 2008
recession followed a liquidity freeze, high oil prices were a partial
cause of the financial crisis. Excessive construction lending had been
made in locations that were dependent on low automobile commuting
costs. Rapidly rising oil prices then reduced the market value of real-
estate on the outskirts of cities causing a significant rise in under-
water mortgages. Sexton, Wu and Zilberman [21] analyzed the role of
rising gasoline prices on the real estate crisis of 2007e2008. They found
that housing prices first dropped in the suburbs and that the foreclosure
rate increased with the distance away from the urban center. With
rising gasoline expenses and no home equity, many lower income
households defaulted. Sexton, Wu and Zilberman’s model showed why
these foreclosures spread throughout the entire overvalued housing
market. Rapidly increasing oil prices did not just affect the housing
market. They also reduced automobile sales and economic activity in
vacation and entertainment-focused regions. All of these conse-
quences resulted from reduced household income after paying un-
avoidable fuel expenses. 10 With reduced spending, important
economic sectors contracted causing dislocations of labor and capital.
The world-wide real estate bubble enabled the economy to tolerate
rising oil prices for a number of years. However, by 2007e2008, the
strain of exponentially rising oil prices on disposable income, employ-
ment and mortgage defaults contributed to the worst world-wide
economic contraction in 75 years.8. Why oil price spikes cause recessions and unemployment
During the last 40 years, each oil spike has been followed by a
sharp drop in world economic growth. There has been only one sharp
annual reduction in world economic growth that was not preceded by
an oil price spike.11 Otherwise, world GDP growth has remained
above 3%, apart from the 1st, 2nd or 3rd years following an oil price
spike. Unless these episodes linking oil price spikes to poor world-
wide economic growth are coincidences, or result from mismanage-
ment of the economy by monetary authorities, there must be a
mechanism through which these oil price spikes cause such economic
harm. This mechanism has been well-researched with many authors
focusing on the multiplier effects that cascade through the economy.
Reduced spending on other goods and services has multiplier effects
that grow over time. Edelstein and Kilian [22] found that the
reduction of spending resulting from an oil price shock accelerates in
later time periods. For example, Edelstein and Kilian found that a
shock causing a 1% spending reduction produces a 2.2% reduction
one-year later. As the economy adjusts to a new pattern of expen-
ditures, transitional effects force the economy to operate below the
potential output until full adjustments are made. These adjustments
include inter-sectoral and inter-regional relocations of labor that are
displaced by reduced spending in the economic sectors that they had
previously worked.10 Fuel expenses are “unavoidable” in the sense that the elasticity of oil demand with
respect to price is low. Consumers believe that they have little choice except to
consume travel and other energy services even when fuel prices are high.
11 There was a sharp decline in growth from 1997 to 1998 (3.7% to 2.4%).
Fig. 1. Real and nominal world oil prices.
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economy involves the motor vehicle industry. Oil price spikes reduce
spending on motor vehicles out of proportion to their effect on
disposable income. The economic harm from decreased automotive
sales cascades throughout the economy. Tracing impulses with a
1949e2012 statistical model, Santini and Poyer [23] showed that real
expenditures on motor vehicles declined immediately following a
gasoline price shock, but well before subsequent declines in employ-
ment. Santini and Poyer [24] also showed for 1967 to 2008 that declines
in U.S. motor vehicle output clearly preceded declines in the rest of
GDP in each of the recessions during that time interval. While auto-
mobile production is typically associated with the United States,
Japan, Germany and South Korea (they are the 2nd to 5th largest
automobile manufacturers), automobile production is widely distrib-
uted. The largest current producer is China and, after South Korea,
there are 11 countries that produce at least 1 millionmotor vehicles per
year. The economic ripple of reduced automobile purchases also ex-
tends to countries that produce few or no automobiles via reduction ofFig. 2. International crude oil prices and global GDP gtheir exports to the auto-producing countries that have reduced
spending and output.
The economic harm caused by oil price increases is not linear.
Hamilton [25] showed that oil price changes do not matter unless they
set a new high relative to the previous 3-years. This supports the view
that economic dislocations are the vector that spread economic harm
beyond the share of GDP lost though higher oil prices. Mork [26] showed
that reductions in oil prices can cause economic harm supporting the
view that major sectoral dislocations caused by abrupt oil price
changes are a key mechanism for economic harm. This could explain
why the rapid decrease in oil prices during the 1980s did little to pro-
mote economic growth. This asymmetry might alternatively suggest
that it is the monetary response to oil price changes that affects the
economy: Monetary responses to higher and lower oil prices may be
asymmetric or may have asymmetric effects. However, before
addressing this question, it is necessary to review whether monetary
policy itself has been an important factor in causing economic disrup-
tions after an oil price shock.rowth. Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011.
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(and beyond) Bernake, Getler and Watson [27] suggested that that
contractionary monetary policies exaggerated the adverse effects of
past oil-price shocks and, with improved monetary policies, oil price
increases need not have serious economic consequences. Hamilton
[28], however, found that the 2007e2009 recession followed earlier oil
price-GDP patterns despite expansionary monetary policies during the
uninterrupted rise of annual oil prices from 2001e2007, noting plunging
U.S. automobile sales and 1.2% lower real GDP growth in 2007. How-
ever, the importance of constructive monetary policy should not be
discounted. Wu and Ni [29] conclude, using symmetric and asymmetric
models, “monetary policies still matter, after accounting for the oil
prices, the energetic variable.” Askari and Krichene [16], whose work
on oil demand elasticities was cited above, conclude that
“Aggressive monetary policies would stimulate oil demand, how-
ever [because of low short term elasticities] would bemet with rigid
oil supply and would turn disruptive to economic growth if there was
little excess capacity in oil output. We argue that a measure of
stability in oil markets cannot be achieved unless monetary policy is
restrained and real interest rates become significantly positive.
Monetary tightening during 1979e1982 might imply that monetary
policy has to be restrained for a long period and with high interest
rates in order to bring stability back to oil markets.”
This monetary policy prescription can be compared to contrary
advice by Bernake, Getler and Watson [27]. Askari and Krichene
emphasize that there is reduced disposable income available to spend
on non-oil commodities because of the oil price shock and that loose
monetary policies will not increase oil supplies.
Returning to the question of whether monetary policy explains the
observed asymmetric effect of oil price changes, Federer [30] con-
cludes that “the monetary channel cannot explain the asymmetry
puzzle“ and “sectoral shocks and uncertainty channels offer a partial
solution to the asymmetry puzzle.” Balke, Brown and Yucel [31]
acknowledge that increased oil prices introduce financial stress and
that “factors other than monetary policy would appear to contribute to
asymmetry on the real side” while acknowledging the influence of
asymmetric Fed policy and the role of interest rates. Davis and Halti-
wanger [32] note that “employment growth declines sharply following
a large oil price increase but changes little following a large oil price
decrease.” Hamilton [33] concludes “empirically, oil price increases
appear to hurt aggregate economic activity while price declines do not
appear to help” and attributes this disparity to the “costs of sectoral
realignments after relative price changes.”
There is evidence that economies have become more resilient
against the adverse effects of oil price increases (Rasmussen and
Roitman [34], Baumeister, Peersman and Van Robays [35]). Nonethe-
less, it goes too far to wonder “whether [oil prices] are really that bad?”
(Rasmussen and Roitman [35]). The decreased elasticity of demand for
oil, combined with evolving conditions in the world oil market, can
more than offset improved economic resiliency to a given oil price in-
crease. As shown in Fig. 2: 1) oil price shocks are invariably followed by
2e3 years of weak economic growth; and 2) weak economic growth is
almost always preceded by an oil price shock. Looking forward, there is
little reason to be complacent about the economic damage that could
be caused by future oil price spikes considering increased instability of12 As marginal suppliers of oil, non-OPEC producers have more to do with setting long-
term international oil prices than does, for example, Saudi Arabia though increased or
decreased production from its spare production capacity. As long as OPEC production
capacity remains relatively flat, the growth in world-wide oil demand must be met with
increased non-OPEC production. Since increasing non-OPEC production means tapping
more expensive-to-produce oil reserves, unless international oil prices are sufficiently
high, there will not be sufficient growth in non-OPEC production to meet growing world-
wide demand.Middle East and North Africa (MENA) oil exporting countries and
increased non-OPEC oil production costs12.
9. Looking forward
The world oil market has been subject to unplanned supply outages
since its inception. However, since 2011, supply outages have increased
considerably from prior years. They also reflect causes that are likely to
be chronic conditions, as opposed to one-off events. During 2010, oil
supply outages averaged less than 1 mmb/d; since 2011, they have
averagedw 3 mmb/d. These outages have been caused by a variety of
problems including tribal grievances with the central government,
sectarian conflict and piracy. The security situation has caused private
industry to withdraw personnel from regions not deemed to be safe. In
addition to loss of trained personnel, insurgent attacks on infrastruc-
ture, political disputes concerning sovereignty and disagreements
about the validity of oil-related contracts are not likely to be passing
problems. While these may be necessary side effects as countries
replace autocratic rule with democratic governments, they nonethe-
less pose a great risk for future oil supplies. The International Energy
Agency (IEA) recently warned that relatively stable oil prices should not
conceal “an abundance of risk” as “much of the Middle East and North
Africa remains in turmoil.” “The current stalemate between the West
and Iran” is “unsustainable” and “sooner or later, something has to
give.” The political situation in the MENA region reflects a “precarious
balance” that does not bode well for “clear, stable and predictable oil
policies, let alone supplies” [36].
The oil-economy problem would be reduced if future oil prices
trended significantly lower as a result of new discoveries and oil-
production technologies. However, there are reasons to believe that
we cannot count on abundant cheap oil as a way out of our oil-economy
problem. First of all, there is a large uncertainty about future oil
supplies. As pointed out by Brant, Plevkin and Farrell [37], “data [for
conventional oil supplies] are unavailable for political or economic
reasons, reserves reporting practices are poor, and some regions are
not yet thoroughly explored.”13
The remaining conventional oil that can be produced at a relatively
low marginal cost is likely to be in MENA OPEC countries (Khatib [39]).
Despite this, OPEC production capacity has grown relatively little for
the last 30 years. For example, OPEC production capacity has risen by
only 1 mmb/d, 2000e2013, while world-wide liquids consumption has
increased by 15 mmb/d over the same time period [40]. Over that time,
growing oil demand has been met by additions to non-OPEC capacity. A
number of disappointing non-OPEC supply developments helped drive
the sharp rise in oil prices from 2002 and 2008. During that period, the
cost of oil and gas drilling equipment and support activities increased
by 260% [41]. More recently, the growth of Canadian oil sands and U.S.
tight oil production has kept the world oil market in balance. Without
increased oil production in the United States and Canada, non-OPEC
production would have been in decline in recent years.
Sufficiently high oil prices are needed to sustain the growth on non-
OPEC oil. The IEA estimates that the cost of oil sands and tight oil
production ranges from $45/b to over $100/b [42]. As production moves
from the most productive plays to less promising plays, costs will tend
to move to the upper end of the IEA range. For example, Global Energy
Securities estimates that the price of oil needed to generate an
attractive internal rate of return increases from $67/b in Eagle Ford to13 Brant, Plevin and Farrell develop a nonlinear optimization model to estimate the
transition to oil substitutes such as gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, bitumen and kerogen.
They relax the “perfect foresight” assumption used in most optimization models of this
type (to estimate producers’ investments) and find that the transition to alternatives
“could be more chaotic.” They appropriately quote Pindyck’s observation that “pro-
ducers may not optimize at all [or] that, to the extent that they do optimize, their time
horizons may be very limited” (Pindyck [38]).
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high,14 they are not that much higher than what’s needed to motivate
the large investments needed to grow non-OPEC oil production.15
Tverberg [20] considers three scenarios of oil supply growth and
their impact on OECD economic growth concluding “we are reaching
limits on the amount of oil that the world can extract at a price OECD
countries can afford to pay without serious recession.” Hallock, et al
[44] confirm Tverberg’s findings using global and national data. Hallock
modeled the future growth of conventional oil16 and concluded that
“proclamations of large future increases of conventional oil.are not
supported by empirical data” and “if there are to be to be significantly
larger quantities of conventional oil produced, then higher oil prices, or
technological innovation will have to have a much larger effect in the
future than they have had in the last 11 years.”
Robelius [45] projects that the production of oil from giant oil fields
will peak from 2008 to 2018 (worst and best case scenarios respec-
tively). As defined by Robelius, a giant filed contains 500 mmb of
recoverable oil. Only 1% of oil fields are giants but they provided 60% of
2005 production and 65% of total recoverable oil reserves. Large in-
creases of production from other sources will be needed to offset the
lost production from giants after they peak. While there are ample
sources of petroleum available to make up the loss, the investment
required to tap these sources will be motivated by higher, not lower,
world oil prices.10. Will tight oil flood the world oil market?
The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2014 Annual Energy
Outlook Early Release has again projected higher levels of U.S. tight
oil production. The reference case has domestic overall oil production
growing through 2020, when total production reaches 9.6 mmb/d.
Tight oil production increases to 4.8 mmb/d by 2020, but declines
after 2021 [46].17
Recent projections of high U.S. tight oil production reflect massive
resource estimates and the explosive production growth in North
Dakota and Texas that have proven past expectations to be too con-
servative. Applying the straight line to past production growth, how-
ever, could provide a false picture of what can reasonably be expected.
Three U.S. plays are responsible for rocketing U.S. production: Bakken,
Eagle Ford and the Permian. In comparison, Niobrara and Anadarko
have only achieved modest production growth while the prospects for
development in the Monterey are poor. Like any major oil field devel-
opment, initial high production growth does not foretell sustained in-
definite growth. For tight oil, the rapidity of change can be even
greater. Consider that two-thirds of tight-oil drilling activity is needed
to maintain constant tight oil production due to the high decline rates
associated with hydraulic fracturing. Inevitably well productivity must
also decline as production expands. Despite high Bakken production
growth, for example, well productivity there has already declined by 15
percent since 2009Q4 to 2012Q4 (Bernstein & Co. [47]). Likewise,
drilling costs cannot continue to decline. Of the 18% well cost deflation
since 2011, Bernstein & Co. distinguishes between cyclical deflation,
about 15%, and secular deflation, about 3% [47]. This suggests that
drilling costs are more likely to rise in the future than decline.14 Since 2011, average oil prices have been significantly higher in real terms than in
the last 50 years apart from the 2007e08 oil price spike.
15 Increased investment is needed just to offset decline rates especially from the
largest “super-giant” oil fields. Investment has to surpass this “break-even” level to
meet growing demand.
16 Using “Uppsala-Campbell” definition that requires a gravity higher than 17.5
degrees.
17 In one year, the EIA increased its projected 2020 tight oil production by 70%. The
estimated 2020 tight oil production was 2.8 mmb/d in the 2013 AEO and grew to 4.8
mmb/d in the 2014 AEO Early Release.A recent study funded by Advanced Resources International (ARI)
and the Energy Information Administration found that only one country,
Russia, has technically recoverable tight-oil resources larger than those
of the United States [48]. China has slightly more than half of the U.S.
resource base, followed in declining order by Argentina, Libya,
Australia, Venezuela, Mexico, Pakistan and Canada (at about one-sixth
the U.S. resource base). Many of these countries can be excluded as
likely tight-oil producers, including Russia, Argentina, Libya, Venezuela
and Pakistan, unless their current political and economic regimes un-
dergo fundamental change. ARI’s top-10 tight-oil countries include
several major oil producing countries (Russia, Libya, Venezuela and
Mexico) that could more easily expand conventional oil production,
something they would likely do if they didn’t have above-ground
problems.18
As valuable as the ARI estimates are, they provide no information on
tight oil production costs in the countries estimated to have significant
tight oil resources. There has been very little exploration of tight-oil
plays around the world apart from some exploration in Argentina and
China (Vaca Muerta and Chinese Jurassic plays respectively). Much
more exploration will be needed before an assessment can be made of
the geological factors that ultimately govern production cost and
feasibility. These include: oil source quality; extent and homogeneity;
pay-zone thickness; existence of permeable beds and maturity. How-
ever, even a favorable outcome on geology may be insufficient to
ensure tight oil production outside of North America. Above-ground
constraints may turn out to be the most significant reason the U.S.
experience is not replicated elsewhere, at least for many years. These
include: political risk; land access; regulatory processes; availability of
an E&P service industry; supply chain; water availability and water
management. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of two
factors that have enabled the development of tight oil and shale gas in
the United States: private ownership of mineral rights and huge service
sector/logistical resources. Without land access and an E&P industry,
especially in countries with a high political risk, significant tight oil
production outside of North America is unlikely even if geology proves
to be favorable. Maugeri [49] also considers these factors to be
important:
“.there are other factors that will make the global replication of a
U.S. shale boom difficult, including an absence of private mineral
rights in most countries, as well as the absences of the U.S. inde-
pendent companies whose guerilla-style operational mindset has
proven essential to the exploitation of shale formations that (unlike
conventional oil and gas fields) required companies to move on a
micro-scale, on multiple micro-objectives, and flexibility, leverage
short-term opportunities.”
In addition, Maugeri observes that shale oil development depends
on low population density and will be more difficult to pursue in more
densely populated areas such as the Monterey play in California and
face “an insurmountable environmental hurdle in Europe and other
parts of the world that have a high population density and no tradition
of intensive drilling.” Maugeri also emphasizes that U.S. shale oil pro-
duction could suddenly decline with lower world oil prices:
“.because shale development occurs on a per-well basis and not an
a field basis, as in conventional oil activity, and critically depends on
short-term oil prices given that peak productions is achieved during18 The above-ground problems vary among these countries but include political
instability; risky business environment; limited or no participation by international oil
companies; limited competence and/or resources of the national oil company; and
insufficient security. Recent reforms in Mexico could reverse the structural decline in
Mexican oil production, especially on previously untapped onshore resources. However,
the turnaround in Mexican production will take years and will require that domestic
content or other requirements don’t create large inefficiencies.
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obtained during the first and second year of production.” [49]19 These and other SPR releases are discussed in http://energy.gov/fe/services/pe-
troleum-reserves/strategic-petroleum-reserve/releasing-oil-spr
20 The U.S. share was 30 mm barrels which were successfully sold and dispersed within
two months. The European sales achieved less than one-third of their target, often
because emergency stock programs that relied on industry mandates failed to put oil
into the market when the respective stock-holding requirements on industry were
relaxed (Patron and Goldwyn [54]).11. Using strategic oil stocks to protect the world-wide economy
against future oil supply disruptions
Strategic oil stocks are the main defense governments have to
protect their economies from oil price shocks. Under normal circum-
stances, government stocks do not increase the short-term elasticity of
oil supply since their release depends on government actions that are
only taken in response to a serious oil supply interruption. Depending
on the volume of internationally held reserves and the rate at which
these reserves can be made available to the market, world-wide
emergency reserves have the potential to offset lost oil supplies as a
result of unplanned supply outages in major oil exporting countries.
Ideally, the prompt release of emergency reserves would prevent an
economically damaging oil-price spike until exports are restored or
alternative sources of supply are secured.
The world economy is less vulnerable to the economic conse-
quences of an unplanned oil supply outage when oil prices are rela-
tively low or OPEC spare capacity is relatively high. Unfortunately,
OPEC spare capacity tends to grow when oil prices are falling and de-
clines when oil prices are rising (see Fig. 3). While this relationship is
not surprising given the reasons why Saudi Arabia maintains reserve
production capacity, nonetheless, it implies that just when the world
economy’s exposure to the economic damages of an oil supply inter-
ruption is greatest, because oil prices are already high, OPEC spare
capacity is likely to be low. It is under these circumstances that a
strategic petroleum stock release would bemost necessary to reduce or
prevent an economically-damaging oil price spike.
The IEA treaty requires its Member-countries to hold enough pe-
troleum or petroleum products to replace 90-days worth of their im-
ports. After a declaration of a petroleum supply emergency, an IEA
collective action would compel Member countries to release agreed-
upon amounts of petroleum or petroleum products from their stra-
tegic reserves. The IEA estimated in 2010 that its Member countries
could release as much asw10 mmb/d during the first month following a
disruption. This would fall to w5 mmb/d in the 5th month following a
disruption [50]. Information on emergency reserves held by countries
outside the IEA is sparse. China may hold as much as 200 million barrels
but reliable information is lacking.
As will be discussed below, it is not always easy to determine
whether an unplanned oil-supply outage constitutes an oil emergency
of sufficient magnitude to justify the release of strategic stocks. In
assessing the potential severity of an oil supply outage, primary
consideration has to be given to the actual or expected changes to the
price of oil for, after all, the price of oil is the vector by which oil supply
disruptions cause economic harm. If a strategic reserve can keep the
price of oil from spiking, it can avoid the economic harm that would
otherwise be caused by the disruption. However, the dividing line be-
tween the normal ups and downs of the oil market and a petroleum
supply emergency that would repeat past episodes of economic harm is
not always easy to draw. If strategic stocks are used in the absence of
clearly defined emergency circumstances, they could discourage
commercial stock holding and decrease net emergency stocks.
12. Lessons learned from past emergency releases from the U.S.
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR)
The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the largest stockpile
of government-owned emergency crude oil in the world. The SPR has a
capacity of 727 million barrels and, as of May, 2014, the SPR held 693
million barrels of crude oil. The SPR is comprised of four storage fa-
cilities connected to three crude distribution systems: Seaway, Texomaand Capline. The maximum drawdown rate has been estimated to be as
high as 4.4 mmb/d with marine capabilities of about 2.5 mmb/d.
However, as will be discussed below, changes to the U.S. midstream
and commercial activities in the Gulf of Mexico have significantly
lowered the maximum drawdown rate of the SPR.
Decisions to withdraw crude oil from the SPR are made by the U.S.
President under the authorities of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act (Pub. L. No. 94-163, 1975). There have been three emergency re-
leases of the SPR19:
1) On 16 January 1991, during the 1990/91 Gulf War, President George
H.W. Bush ordered the first-ever emergency drawdown of the SPR
resulting in the sale of 17.3 million barrels of crude. The Iraqi in-
vasion of Kuwait occurred on 2 August 1990 curtailing 7% of world
oil production. By mid-October, oil prices had doubled. Within days
of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States responded by
sending U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.
Operation Desert Storm commenced on 17 January 1991, one day
after the emergency oil stock release was announced. The Gulf
War was concluded on 28 February with the liberation of Kuwait
and the retreat of Iraq occupation forces. In retrospect, the Gulf
War release would have been much more effective if it had been
announced in early August, 1990, in sufficient volume, to prevent
or substantially reduce the doubling of oil prices that occurred
within two months. It is conceivable that an earlier release would
have mitigated or prevented the recession of 1991. However, in
August 1990, it wasn’t clear how long the oil market would remain
disrupted or whether Saudi Arabian production might be affected.
Contemporary objections to an August release of the SPR were: 1)
SPR reserves should not be depleted lest they be needed for a
longer and larger supply outage; and 2) other OPEC countries
should increase production to help replace lost Kuwaiti supplies
(Taylor and Van Doren [51]).
2) In 2005, President George W. Bush ordered a release of 11 million
barrels of crude from the SPR after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
caused significant damage to the oil production facilities, termi-
nals, pipelines, and refineries along the U.S. Gulf Coast. The
release of crude oil replaced supplies lost from crude oil produc-
tion in the Gulf of Mexico. However, if the SPR system contained
petroleum products, in addition to crude oil, it is likely that the
subsequent increase of petroleum product prices would have been
much smaller as these hurricanes disabled 50% of the refining ca-
pacity in the Gulf Coast region, a problem not alleviated by crude
oil supplies from the SPR.
3) On June 23, 2011, the IEA agreed to release a total of 60 million
barrels of petroleum as a result of protests and civil war that
erupted February 15, 2011 (the beginning of the “Arab Spring”). 20
Libya had provided about 1.5 mmb/d of light-sweet crude oil to
the world market. Despite the small loss of global oil production
(less than 2% of global oil supplies) and 4 mmb/d of spare pro-
duction capacity [52], Brent prices increased by w$20/barrel by
April 2011 [53]. The June 23 release was timed to help mitigate
the negative economic impacts that could result from elevated oil
prices as refineries were returning from seasonal maintenance.
Brent crude prices fell by $7/barrel on the day the IEA/SPR
release was announced. The severe backwardation of Brent was
reversed causing Brent and WTI prices to align (in contango). This
Fig. 3. US Imported Crude Prices and OPEC Spare Capacity. Source: The Rapidan Group; EIA data.
22 Nonetheless it is worth noting that some authors have concluded that the current
SPR is far too large to be cost-effective and its oil should be sold off (e.g., Taylor and
Van Doren, [51]). Others find that the SPR is too small. For example, Edmunds and Singh
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August. Nonetheless, independent analysts concluded that the
release calmed the market preventing a more damaging oil price
spike.21 As with the 1990/1991 Gulf War release, in retrospect, it
can be questioned whether the Libyan Collective Action would
have been more effective had it been announced in late February
2011 since peak oil prices were reached in April, two months
before the IEA/SPR release. However, in February, it wasn’t clear
whether a loss of 1.5 million barrels/day of exports, even exports
of light sweet crude that were important to European refineries,
was a serious enough disruption to warrant a stock release. There
were also concerns that a stock release would deter an increase of
Saudi Arabian production or give markets the impression that
surplus production capacity could not replace lost Libyan supplies
(Clayton [55]).
The 1991 and 2011 SPR releases illustrate the difficulty in deciding
whether and when to release the SPR. They demonstrate four impor-
tant issues that can delay a quick response to a supply outage: 1)
whether the supply disruption is of sufficient magnitude to justify the
use of the SPR; 2) whether the SPR should be held in reserve lest the
disruption becomes more severe; 3) whether the release of strategic
stocks would discourage employment of OPEC spare production ca-
pacity; and 4) the time that is required to achieve a consensus by IEA
Member countries to undertake a coordinated drawdown. Even critics
of the SPR recognize that the potential benefits of the SPR have not
been realized because “it has not been used frequently, robustly and
quickly enough during the early stages of oil price shocks (Taylor and
Van Doren [51]).” Taylor and Van Doren believe that “there is little
reason to believe that the program’s dynamics will change in the
future.” They conclude that the oil in the SPR should be sold and the
program shut down. However, the cost-effectiveness of the SPR pro-
gram could be improved by reforming the decision-making process so
SPR stocks would be used quickly enough, in sufficient quantity, to
prevent or mitigate future oil-price spikes. Clayton [55] also recognizes
that even though the SPR may not be effective in lowering oil prices
(they “may have only a modest effect of prices and broader market21 John Kemp, Reuters, September 19, 2011 and additional assessments by experts at
the Baker Institute at Rice University; Ed Morse, head of commodities research at Cit-
igroup; and Olivier Jakob of Petromatrix in Geneva.forces can overwhelm them”) it may “be more effective at preventing
harmful price spikes.” Consequently, tardy use of emergency stocks
should be avoided. Also, as Clayton concludes, the threat of an oil stock
release must be credible and “mixed signals from energy officials about
a possible future release, as in July 2011, canmake oil prices evenmore
volatile” (Clayton [55]). Avoiding “mixed signals,” or announcing a
stock release before prices have spiked, requires that difficult de-
cisions be made before a supply disruption has played out. There has to
be a quick consensus on how much the disruption is likely to raise oil
prices. Even then, there are “blurry lines,” as noted by Jaffe and Soligo
[56] before oil prices are high enough to justify a strategic stock
release. Nonetheless, as Patron and Goldwyn [54] point out,
“In many cases, the United States has failed to deploy the reserve
despite circumstances that would justify a release. These missed
opportunities result in price run-ups that may have been avoidable
and uncertainty as to when the U.S. government would release
stocks in future crises.”13. Implications of reduced U.S. oil import dependence
It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the optimal size of
the SPR or world-wide strategic stocks. It is also beyond the scope of
this paper to consider different processes for releasing emergency oil
reserves. Consequently, the implications of reduced U.S. oil import
dependence are discussed in the context of an SPR that is approxi-
mately the same size as it is today and is governed by current U.S. law
and IEA treaty obligations.22 Nonetheless, the significant reduction of
U.S. oil imports, resulting from declining domestic gasoline consump-
tion and rising domestic oil production, require that we ask: What is the[57] suggest that the size of the SPR be significantly increased to give the United States
more leverage in the international oil market. Blumstein and Komor [58] suggest, in
order to make the use of the SPR more predictable, and to make an SPR release less
likely to “heighten tensions in an already tense situation,” that the SPR be operated by a
chartered corporation that could release SPR reserves without a declaration of an oil
supply emergency by the U.S. President.
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U.S. IEA stock holding obligations are also falling, in line with our
declining oil imports, since the IEA treaty requires that each Member-
country hold 90 days of its petroleum imports.
The growth of U.S. and Canadian oil production has also affected
the physical ability of the SPR to distribute oil during a supply emer-
gency. Midcontinent refiners are no longer relying on crude petroleum
imports shipped from the U.S. Gulf Coast. Instead, oil is flowing by
pipeline, rail and barge to the U.S. Gulf Coast rather than from the Gulf
Coast. East Coast refining capacity has also declined by 40% from a
September 2005 high of 1.7 mmb/d to less than 1 mmb/d by November
2013 [59]. These changes affect the use of the SPR in two ways: 1) since
many U.S. refineries have replaced crude oil that had been provided by
foreign tankers with domestic or Canadian crude oil, the number of
refineries that would need to secure SPR oil in the event of an inter-
national petroleum supply emergency has declined; and 2) the pipe-
lines that the SPR formerly used to provide SPR oil to domestic
refineries have been repurposed. Of major significance has been the
reversal of the Seaway and Capline pipelines which had formerly been
relied on to move SPR crude north but now move midcontinent and
Canadian crude south. Flow was also reversed on the Ho-Ho pipeline in
order to provide Bakken and Eagle Ford crude oil to U.S. Gulf Coast
refineries. In addition, the surge in U.S. product exports has increased
product tanker traffic in the Gulf Coast complicating the logistics of
loading SPR oil onto barges or tankers. As a result of these de-
velopments, the Department of Energy conducted an SPR test sale in
March-April, 2014 to help evaluate the capability of the SPR to expe-
ditiously release emergency oil reserves.24
As the United States moves towards “energy independence,” the
raison d’etre of the SPR would have to shift from replacing lost U.S. oil
imports to U.S. refineries, after an international disruption, to reducing
the international price of oil, regardless of which refineries process the
oil that would be released from the SPR.25 As discussed above, oil price
spikes cause inter-sectoral and inter-regional disruptions of labor and
capital and, as a result, reduce U.S. GDP growth. These disruptions to
labor and capital markets are caused by higher petroleum product
prices and are not affected by the level of U.S. oil imports. However, if
we import less oil, there is a smaller wealth transfer to oil exporting
countries as a result of an oil price spike. With higher domestic oil
production, more of the money spent on fuels by U.S. consumers stays
in the U.S. economy. As higher U.S. oil company profits are recycled
through the U.S. economy, through increased upstream oil production,
investments and dividends, economic gains are realized. Nonetheless,
the initial economic dislocations caused by the oil price spike are not
avoided. While higher U.S. oil company revenues may facilitate inter-
sectoral and inter-regional relocations of labor and capital, it still
takes time for the adjustments to occur. We will still experience lower
economic growth during the first to third year after an oil price shock.
Since oil prices sharply decline after the fall-off in world GDP growth,
the increase in U.S. oil company revenues after an oil price shock may
be short-lived, ending well before they have a significant effect on
labor and capital market realignment. Consequently, the time required23 The EIA 2014 Annual Energy Outlook projects that the net percentage of U.S. oil and
liquids imports, relative to U.S. consumption, will drop to 25% by 2016 (Reference Case).
Their High Oil and Gas Resource Case projects a much sharper decline of U.S. oil imports
with net imports steadily declining to zero before 2040.
24 http://www.spr.doe.gov/doeec/TestSale14/Notice_of_Sale.pdf
25 U.S. law restricts the export of SPR reserves and most domestically-produced crude
oil (Energy Policy and Conservation Act; Pub. L. No. 94-163, 1975). SPR oil may be sold to
a foreign refinery if the products produced from that oil are to be returned to the United
States. However, U.S. law also provides the President of the United States authority to
permit sales of domestically-produced crude oil or SPR reserves to foreign refineries
(without re-import requirements) if the President determines that such sales would be
in the national interest.to return to normal-GDP growth after an oil price shock may not be
greatly affected by lower U.S. oil imports.
The specter of an energy-independent United States holding the
largest emergency petroleum stockpile makes clear, as pointed out by
William Hogan, that:
“despite the combined force of common sense and computer
studies, oil-importing governments have not succeeded in building a
reserve of oil that matches the apparent threat of insecure supplies.
In part this reflects a lack of commitment to the objective, and
governments have spent an inordinate amount of effort in trying to
convince others to do their stockpiling for them” (Hogan [60]).
If the United States is to accept the burden of maintaining the
world’s largest emergency reserve, despite declining reliance on oil
imports, in order to protect the world economy (and, of course, its own
economy) in the event of an oil supply disruption, there should be
corresponding efforts by other countries to build emergency stocks,
especially the emerging Asian economies that are largely responsible
for the growth of world oil demand. As world oil consumption shifts
from the OECD to emerging economies26, oil-importing countries that
are now outside the treaty obligations of the IEA should establish
emergency oil reserves as their economies are also vulnerable to the
economic consequences of a world-wide oil-supply interruption.14. Conclusions and policy implications
Oil price shocks are invariably followed by 2e3 years of weak eco-
nomic growth and weak economic growth is almost always preceded by
an oil price shock. If we look forward, there is little reason to be
complacent about the economic damage that could be caused by future
oil price spikes considering the increased instability of Middle Eastern
and North African oil suppliers. The investments needed for non-OPEC
oil production to keep up with the growth in worldwide demand are
challenging and do not appear to be feasible in a low-price
environment.
Oil price spikes will remain a threat to world economic growth.
Strategic oil reserves can protect the world-wide economy, if suffi-
ciently large releases are promptly announced, by preventing the oil
price spikes that would otherwise occur as a result of unplanned supply
outages. Governments should streamline procedures for a coordinated
release of emergency stocks and recognize the important economic
benefits to be had by a prompt and sufficient stock release that would
eliminate or substantially reduce oil price shocks. Because of increased
U.S. oil production, the repurposing of midstream assets that the SPR
had previously relied on and increased U.S. refineries’ processing of
domestic petroleum, the capability of the SPR to respond to a serious
petroleum supply emergency needs to be reassessed.27 As U.S. oil im-
ports continue to decline, in order to avoid a spike of international oil
prices after a serious supply disruption, it may be necessary to increase
the capacity of the SPR to deliver oil to the U.S. Gulf Coast, increase
tanker loading capacity and sell SPR oil directly to foreign refineries. As
the United States is unable to use its SPR to protect its economywithout
providing similar benefits to the rest of the world, and since global oil
consumption is only growing outside of the OECD, the emerging econ-
omies, especially in Asia, should develop larger strategic oil stocks. This
would not only increase the volume of oil available to respond to an oil
supply emergency but aim toward a fair sharing of the oil stocks burden
in recognition of their collective world-wide economic benefit.26 The majority of oil demand has recently shifted from the OECD to the non-OECD. By
2030, China is expected to become the world’s largest consumer of petroleum while
OECD oil demand is expected to decline [5].
27 A reassessment has begun with the SPR test sale of March-April, 2014 to help
determine the SPR’s current distribution capabilities.
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